Memorandum for Mr. Stettinius by unknown
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
Fox £/ 
Fol<3e7\3 I 
Item
September 18, 1944 Pag*5 r
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. STETTINIUS 
1. The following memorandum sets forth views held 
by a number of the American Delegation including (as 
regards the military factors) all the military and 
naval members. A different point of view, not to be 
regarded so much as positive dissent from the views 
herein expressed as rather, the proposal of a possibly 
more promising method of approach to a satisfactory 
outcome, is presented by those members not concurring
in this statement.
2. The situation at Dumbarton Oaks has developed 
into what is practically an impasse on the question as 
to whether a permanent member of the Security Council, who 
is a party to a dispute, shall have the right to vote in 
that dispute.
3. The question of whether the conference should 
adjourn without further effort to resolve this impasse 
is one which must be decided in the highest level. In 
view of the world-wide interest centered on the Dumbarton 
Oaks conference, and the public pronouncements already 
made in connection with its work, no failure- to agree 
on any vital question can fail to be regarded as a 
disagreement by those sc disposed.
4. In
4. In the present political situation, any
disagreement can be played up by partisan political 
elements in a manner that would be seriously detrimented
to Russo-American or British-American relations. .
6. If this conference is generally considered to
have been a failure, the results may ba serious and far
reaching and may even threaten the whole project of the  
International Organization for International peace and security. 
6. In the first place, there will remain no
probability of a successful United Nations conference,
since the Soviet Ambassador has stated that his 
Government will not take part in such a conference  
unless the Soviet position in this vital question is 
agreed to.
7. Such a development would constitute a definite 
break in the solidarity of the three great powers at
a time when such solidarity is absolutely essential 
to the speedy and successful conclusion of the war, and 
to laying the foundation for future security.
8. Whatever the extent of the break with the 
Soviets, It could only adversely affect the Soviets 
action in entering the war against Japan. For this 
reason the question now under consideration has vital
military implications, which in the last analysis may 
involve
involve lengthening the war against Japan, with all 
the costs in lives and money which this would involve.
9. The direct results in Europe of a break with 
the Soviets, may not be so definitely foreseen, but inattempting to forecast soviet policy in Europe, without the restrictions of a 
world organization, it must be
noted that Soviets will be the dominant military power
in Europe and could not be successfully challenged in 
that area by any combination of powers.
10. If we are to avoid the many serious results of 
adjourning this conference without agreement in this
crucial question, it would seem that either the United
states or the Soviets must accept the others position or 
an acceptable compromise must be developed. 
11. It is the belief of the military group at
Dumbarton Oaks that after the elimination of Germany 
and Japan, armed power in the world will be so largely 
concentrated in the United States and the Soviet Union 
that the British Empire will find it to its advantage 
to cooperate in the world organization and express its 
agreement, with those states in the immediate future,
including the question of voting arrangement as here 
proposed.
12, Compromise within the conference has failed 
but there remains the possibility of a direct appeal 
by the President to Marshal Stalin and Mr. Churchill.
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It is proposed therefore that such appeal be made - 
first on the basis of the suggestion of the American 
Group dated 13 September, and secondly, in substantially 
the following form: 
 "In questions concerning the prevention or 
suppression of aggression, decisions shall be
taken by majority vote including the affirmative
.
vote of the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. and China,
1
Any member of the Council may abstain from
voting and by abstention be not obliged to
• •• >■ <■'“«.• ■
join in the movement for the prevention or
■ ■ ’
suppression of aggression In that instance.
/
But In ease that member does not abstain when 
party to a dispute with a state or states not 
members of the Council such state or states
may sit in the proceedings and, individually 
or collectively, be entitled to one vote as 
a member of the Council."
13. Should the above suggested action looking 
toward a compromise fall, It is proposed that the present 
United States position be fully re-examined with a view 
to returning to the United States position as originally 
accepted, In numerous draft documents In the past two 
years. In support of this proposal the following Is 
submitted.
14. during
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14. During most of the conversation which have___ -
*
taken place in the Department of State beginning in
1942, the right of the veto power was considered 
essential for each of the big four. Time and again 
substitutes were considered but none was found which 
could meet the acid test that in the last analysis 
there had to be force behind the organization and the 
Big Four were the earn that could provide it.
18. In July 1944 this question was again 
considered and our position was modified to the extent
that an effort should be mde to find, a solution for
. / ■ ■ ■. ■-■ -r ‘ - .-.T-.^ dr Sag ,.. ;
the situation in which one of the Big Four was party
• • . 1 
to a dispute. No solution has been found which is' - ’ • * '•’■ Mi ■ ' ••“■ -1 _ e J • •? ‘ v'
acceptable to the members of the Dumbarton conference.
16. In conversations held by the Secretary of 
State with two group of Senators, our position was 
Indicated to Include the right of veto on the part of 
the United States. It was Implicit In the understanding 
of the group of Senators headed by Senator Connally, 
and by the so-called B2H2 group of Senators, that the 
United States would have a veto, as a member of the 
Big Four, particularly when It came to the use of force. 
The same explanation was given to the members of the 
House group who were in conference with the Secretary 
of state.
17. Copies
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17. Copies of the documents stating the American
position without qualification as to our right of veto
were placed in the hands of the Congressional groups 
headed by Senator Connally and Speaker Rayburn. Among 
these groups are members of the opposition who may be
expected to oppose the administration in its efforts
to secure approval by the Senate. •/.
 18. In conclusion, it is the opinion of this group
that if viewed realistically, this question of veto or
.
no veto, which new threatens to wreck the proposed
 r
organization at the start will NOT prove to be the, ! •
critical factor in the future success of the organization. 
In fact this question is largely academic. A great power 
when dealing with matters not vital to it nay be expected
r ’ » •'• .• ’ *
to accede to fee decisions of the council whether or not 
it has a right of veto, On fee other hand in natters 
vital to a nation, that nation cannot be expected to 
accede to the dictates of the council, whether or not 
it has the veto power; and in such a case the organi­
zation will be impotent to enforce its decision against 
any of the three great powers.
